This is the existing public-case verification mode, not a new demonstration format. The source is Roland Berger's official public case study on engineering excellence and complexity management. We first isolate the later-stage answer describing what the firm eventually did and achieved, then reconstruct only what was knowable at the moment of decision into a training dataset for Minerva Advisor. This is an independent teaching simulation built on that public source. It is not real client correspondence, and Roland Berger has not used, reviewed, endorsed, sponsored, certified, or commissioned Minerva Advisor in any way. The situation: after several mergers and acquisitions, the manufacturer's product portfolio overlapped and development activity fragmented across business units. More than eighty percent of variants generated less than twenty percent of sales, and up to sixty percent of variants generated no sales at all. The question facing the Chief Product Officer is whether to cut all low-performing variants immediately, or first run a short, stoppable portfolio validation to decide which variants to freeze, retain, or exit, and what evidence would reverse that sequencing. Every judgment leaves a five-item work receipt. First, one authoritative source. Second, four professional roles brought into the review. Third, facts separated cleanly from inferences. Fourth, three open items flagged as unresolved. Fifth, two decision paths compared side by side, along with the alternative explanations and reversal condition tracked alongside them. Nothing here is a demonstration performance; it is the same auditable record that sits inside every Decision Room run, so the reasoning behind the recommendation can be checked line by line. What is known: variants are heavily concentrated in the low-volume segment, the portfolio overlaps across business units, and this complexity is driving up cost and slowing responsiveness. What remains unknown at decision time: each variant's regional demand, gross margin, customer contracts, regulatory dependencies, service revenue, and exit cost. Minerva's recommendation was to run the short, stoppable validation first, since the customer, regulatory, and cost data needed to distinguish real redundancy from necessary differentiation are still missing. The strongest challenge came from three angles. The zero-sales figure could simply be a data-lag artifact from merger integration rather than true redundancy. The push for validation could reflect regional teams protecting turf rather than genuine contract risk. And engineering's cost complaints may stem from shared-resource fragmentation that cutting variants would not even fix. The reversal condition follows directly: if validation finds no contractual, regulatory, or shared-resource dependencies among the zero-sales variants within the short window, the recommendation escalates to broader cuts; otherwise, the freeze stands. Deliberately withheld from Minerva's input was Roland Berger's later-stage answer: the three-phase program that mapped every product variant, then eliminated low performers and aligned regional processes, and finally introduced a modular platform, resulting in a forty-five percent reduction in variants along with gains in research and development, procurement, manufacturing, development time, and capital expenditure. Minerva never saw this outcome and did not reconstruct it after the fact; the recommendation was built solely from what was knowable before that program existed. Three advisors then cross-checked the same judgment. Marcus framed the question around what evidence must exist before any irreversible elimination. Sofia modeled second-order effects on customers, regions, research and development, and management. Evelyn challenged whether a validation phase could quietly turn into delay. All three converged on the same answer: run a short, stoppable portfolio validation that checks regional demand, margin, contracts, regulatory status, and service necessity before touching zero-sales variants. Evelyn's concern stood: validation lowers the risk of wrongful elimination, but without a defined scope, deadline, and exit threshold, it could stall the whole effort. The executive responded with one condition: check regional demand, margin, contracts, regulatory status, and service necessity item by item first, and only move variants that fail those thresholds into exit evaluation. This tests whether executive input changes the underlying judgment. Minerva recorded the answer and marked the original recommendation as maintained, now with concrete boundaries rather than an open-ended review. Comparing the two paths: immediate, across-the-board elimination cuts complexity and cost fastest, but risks removing variants with regulatory, service, or strategic value, and any resulting customer loss is hard to reverse. The short validation path uses a defined set of metrics to classify each variant as freeze, retain, or exit, at the cost of validation time and some delayed savings. The executive chose the second, reversible path. The committed action: the portfolio team is now assigned to compile each variant's regional demand, gross margin, customer contracts, regulatory status, and exit cost within a short, defined window, forming the basis for the freeze, retain, or exit classification. Minerva tracks that this action was assigned; it does not claim that any variant has actually been reduced or that financial benefits have been realized. This run passed ten out of ten decision-quality checks. It used four model calls, delivered the first decision in 17.057 seconds, and completed the full result in 24.970 seconds, passing both the thirty-second first-decision threshold and the forty-five-second complete-result threshold. This remains a single, independent teaching-simulation run based on a public case; it does not represent guaranteed production performance or real client outcomes.