This is not a new demonstration format. It follows our existing public case validation process. The material is sourced from ghSMART's official public case study on CEO succession. We isolated the later-stage answers, then reconstructed what was knowable at decision time into an instructional data package. Minerva Advisor completed one paid live run, and this is a verified replay of that actual Decision Room session. It does not imply that ghSMART used, reviewed, endorsed, sponsored, certified, or commissioned Minerva Advisor, and it does not represent real client correspondence or real client outcomes. This is an independent teaching simulation built on a public source. The case opens with a multinational pharmaceutical company anticipating a CEO transition roughly five years out. The chief executive, the chief human resources officer, and the board must jointly decide how to manage succession. Minerva was asked to weigh two paths: commit now to a single internal candidate, or maintain a slate of internal and external candidates and converge gradually as strategy, capability, relationships, and readiness become clearer. The five-year runway creates real risk in either direction, from a stalled slate to a premature, entrenched choice. This run left an auditable five-item work receipt. Minerva separated the known facts from open unknowns, weighed two candidate strategies side by side, logged three alternative explanations for why a slate might be favored, and recorded one explicit reversal condition. Each item is traceable, so an executive can see exactly what evidence supported the recommendation and what would change it. Here is what was known: the transition is roughly five years away, naming one person too early risks driving other talent away, and failing to converge at all wastes development time and external search effort. Here is what remains unknown: the future CEO success criteria, the full candidate pool, each candidate's readiness gaps, and current external market demand for outside candidates. None of these gaps were filled before Minerva reasoned about the decision. The strongest challenge Minerva retained is this: the slate approach might exist mainly to avoid conflict-of-interest scrutiny, an internal front-runner may already be obvious to insiders, and keeping a broad slate could itself accelerate attrition among candidates who sense they are just backups. The reversal condition is explicit: if the board and strategy stakeholders cannot agree on defined success criteria and gate thresholds within a reasonable near-term window, the slate approach should be reconsidered, since it lacks the governance discipline the situation demands. The published case later describes ghSMART working with the CEO, the CHRO, and the board to build a future-facing CEO profile, identify candidates, coach the eventual choice, and support a smooth first-year launch. All of that later-stage material, including which candidate was ultimately chosen and how the transition performed, was withheld from Minerva's input. The test was whether Minerva could independently reach a sound judgment about slate strategy and convergence sequencing without ever seeing that published answer. Three advisors cross-checked this judgment. Marcus framed the real decision as when, and on what evidence, the board should converge. Sofia modeled consequences for the board, the incumbent CEO, the candidates, and the broader executive team. Evelyn challenged whether the candidate slate was genuinely open or merely nominal. All three converged on the same recommendation: retain an adjustable candidate slate and move through defined governance gates rather than naming a winner now. Evelyn also flagged that an outwardly fair slate can still be quietly shaped by the incumbent CEO's or the board's existing relationships, leaving the organization in prolonged uncertainty about who actually holds power. In response, the executive required that the board first set confidentiality rules, fairness standards, conflict-of-interest safeguards, and clear reversal thresholds. The instruction was direct: if candidate comparison starts to be dominated by a single preference, stop and restructure governance before proceeding. Minerva laid out the tradeoff plainly. Naming one candidate now allows earlier, more focused development, but reversing that choice becomes costly if strategy or performance shifts within the five-year window. Retaining a slate preserves flexibility, at the price of higher governance and communication overhead. This is where the system shows whether executive input actually changes the underlying judgment: even after the executive's added conditions on confidentiality and fairness, the recommendation held steady, favoring the slate and gated convergence over an early single-name commitment. The executive selected the slate path and required gradual convergence through governance gates. The committed next step is for the board succession committee to charter itself to jointly define five-year CEO success criteria and a gate schedule before narrowing any candidates. The committee will then present the candidate slate, readiness assessments, confidentiality rules, fairness standards, conflict-of-interest safeguards, and reversal thresholds to the full board for approval at the next meeting. On the actual English run, Minerva used four model calls, delivered its first decision in 16.224 seconds, and completed the full result in 23.705 seconds, passing both the 30-second first-decision threshold and the 45-second complete-result threshold. The case passed ten out of ten decision-quality checks. Minerva does not provide leadership appointment advice, and no claim is made that any real candidate or succession outcome has occurred. This remains a single-case live test of Minerva's capability, not a demonstration of production-level service or real customer outcomes.