This is not a new demonstration format. It is a replay of an existing public-case validation process, built from EY-Parthenon's official public case description. We first isolated the later-stage answers, then reconstructed only what was knowable at the time of the decision into an educational data package. Minerva Advisor completed one paid, live run, and this video is a validation replay of that actual Decision Room session. This is an independent teaching simulation based on an official public source. It does not imply that EY-Parthenon used, reviewed, endorsed, sponsored, or commissioned Minerva Advisor, and it does not represent real correspondence or real client results. The case opens with a software company CEO who cannot see into the technical progress or spending of the research and development organization, calling it an impenetrable black box. The company's large product portfolio also lacks go-to-market capability, a strategic roadmap, and a common way to measure R&D. Minerva does not equate limited visibility with inefficiency. Instead, it compares two paths: immediately reprioritizing or stopping product investment, or first establishing a time-boxed, stoppable performance and portfolio evidence gate. This run drew on one source document, identified four decision-making roles, separated six established facts from two inferences, and surfaced three open questions. It compared two actionable paths and preserved three alternative explanations along with one reversal condition. Together, these five work items form an auditable receipt: executives can check off, item by item, exactly which evidence is still missing before committing to a product trade-off decision. What is known: R&D progress and spending lack visibility, and the product portfolio lacks a shared roadmap and a common measurement baseline. What remains unknown: each product's strategic role, target customer segment, and outcomes; how spending and technical progress connect to adoption, quality, support, and go-to-market capability; and which product dependencies are approaching a point of no return. The system preserves its own strongest counterargument: some products may already be forming irreversible resource commitments, so waiting for a full-portfolio evidence gate could increase losses on those items, while immediate reprioritization could just as easily damage effective investments elsewhere. The reversal condition is explicit: if window-and-lock-in evidence for a specific product shows that waiting would cause substantial irreversible loss, the recommendation reverses, and that product is addressed immediately, ahead of the broader gate. Executives can expand four educational simulation notices in the record. EY-Parthenon's later-stage R&D performance measurement method, its product governance and portfolio framework, the business-unit reorganization, and the resulting outcomes were deliberately withheld from Minerva's input. Minerva had no prior knowledge of the official published approach or its organizational results; its recommendation was built solely from what was knowable before that answer existed. Three advisors cross-checked one judgment. Marcus framed the real decision as identifying the minimum evidence needed before the next R&D commitment. Sofia modeled the consequences across the board, product and technology, commercial, and risk teams. Evelyn challenged whether an evidence gate might itself delay action past the point where a product's commitments become irreversible. All three converged on a time-boxed, product-level evidence gate, with Evelyn's caveat built in as a standing exception. The Decision Room tests whether real executive input changes the underlying judgment. Evelyn's point stood: if a product is nearing an irreversible resource commitment, waiting for every product to complete a common baseline actually raises risk. The executive required parallel monitoring of each product's window, so urgent items could be identified, reversed if needed, and handled first, without waiting on the full evidence gate. Immediate reprioritization or stopping would respond quickly to board pressure, but without product-level evidence, it risks harming investments that are actually performing well. The evidence gate allows a real comparison across roadmaps, customer outcomes, and the linkage between spending and progress, at the cost of leaving part of the black box in place for a short, bounded period. The executive chose the evidence gate, while retaining the right to reverse course immediately for any product nearing an irreversible commitment. The committed next step: within three weeks, the Product and Technology Investment team will submit, for every product, its strategic role, roadmap, customer outcomes, the linkage between spending and technical progress, and the timing of any approaching irreversible commitments. Minerva does not claim that products have already been reprioritized, that R&D performance has improved, or that any organizational restructuring has taken place. This EY-Parthenon case passed ten out of ten decision-quality checks. The Decision Room run used four model calls, delivered its first decision in 18.980 seconds, and completed the full analysis, including cross-checking by three advisors, in 26.460 seconds, passing both the 30-second first-decision threshold and the 45-second complete-result threshold. Decision quality, customer experience, and performance all passed. This remains a single case test and does not represent production-level service standards or real customer outcomes.